Introduction

In Philippine criminal law, the interplay between political crimes like rebellion and common crimes such as murder, robbery, or arson raises significant questions about prosecution and sentencing. The core issue is whether rebellion, as defined under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), can form a complex crime with these common offenses under Article 48 of the RPC. This concept of "complexing" implies that multiple felonies arising from a single act or where one is a necessary means to commit another are treated as a single crime, with the penalty for the most serious offense imposed in its maximum period.

This article examines the legal framework surrounding rebellion, the doctrine of complex crimes, and the prevailing jurisprudence that addresses whether rebellion absorbs or can be complexed with common crimes. Rooted in the Philippine context, it draws from the provisions of the RPC, landmark Supreme Court decisions, and related statutory developments. The analysis underscores the political nature of rebellion and its implications for criminal liability, emphasizing that common crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion are generally absorbed into the principal offense, precluding complexing.

Definition and Elements of Rebellion

Rebellion is codified under Article 134 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968 (the Coup d'Etat Law of 1990). It states: "The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."

The essential elements are:

A public uprising and taking up of arms against the government.
The purpose must be political, specifically to overthrow or undermine governmental authority as outlined in the article.

Unlike treason, which involves aiding enemies during war, or sedition, which is a lesser disturbance without the intent to overthrow, rebellion is a grave political offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 135, depending on the participant's role (leaders vs. mere participants). Importantly, rebellion is considered a continuing crime, meaning acts committed over time in pursuit of the rebellious objective form part of a single offense.

This political character distinguishes rebellion from common crimes, which are typically motivated by personal gain or malice without challenging state sovereignty. Common crimes include homicide (Article 249), murder (Article 248), robbery (Article 293), arson (Article 320), and others under Books I and II of the RPC.

The Concept of Complex Crimes Under Article 48

Article 48 of the RPC provides for complex crimes in two scenarios:

Compound crime (delito compuesto): When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (e.g., a single gunshot killing two persons, resulting in double murder).
Complex crime proper (delito complejo): When one offense is a necessary means to commit another (e.g., falsification of a document to commit estafa).

The rationale is to avoid multiple prosecutions for interconnected acts, imposing a unified penalty based on the gravest offense in its maximum degree. However, this does not apply to continuing crimes, special complex crimes (e.g., robbery with homicide under Article 294), or where the law provides otherwise.

Applying this to rebellion: If a rebel kills a government soldier during an uprising, is this murder complexed with rebellion? Or if arson is committed to destroy government property in furtherance of the rebellion, does it form a complex crime? These questions hinge on whether the common crime is inherent to or absorbed by the rebellion.

The Hernandez Doctrine: Absorption Over Complexing

The seminal ruling on this matter is People v. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-6025-26, May 18, 1956), where the Supreme Court, en banc, established what is known as the "Hernandez doctrine." Amado V. Hernandez and others were charged with rebellion complexed with murder, arson, and robbery under Article 48.

The Court held that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes when the latter are committed in furtherance of the political objective of rebellion. Key reasoning:

Rebellion inherently involves violence, tumult, and destruction as means to achieve its political ends. Acts like killing, burning, or looting are not separate offenses but integral to the rebellion itself.
To complex rebellion with common crimes would violate the principle against double jeopardy and lead to absurd penalties, as rebellion's penalty (reclusion perpetua) could be escalated beyond logical bounds.
The RPC treats rebellion as a single, indivisible offense encompassing all acts in pursuit thereof, absorbing common crimes as mere modalities.

Justice Concepcion, in the majority opinion, emphasized: "The crime of rebellion consists of many acts... It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots." Thus, common crimes are "absorbed" into rebellion, and the accused can only be convicted of simple rebellion, not a complex form.

This doctrine was reaffirmed in People v. Geronimo (G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956), where the Court clarified that absorption applies only if the common crime furthers the rebellion. If the act is unrelated (e.g., a personal murder during the rebellion), it may be prosecuted separately.

Reaffirmation and Expansion in Subsequent Jurisprudence

The Hernandez doctrine has been consistently upheld and expanded:

In People v. Lava (G.R. No. L-4974-82, May 16, 1969), the Court applied absorption to members of the Hukbalahap movement, treating murders and arsons as part of rebellion.
Ponce Enrile v. Salazar (G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990) addressed charges against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile and others for rebellion complexed with murder during the 1989 coup attempt. The Court reiterated Hernandez, ruling that "all crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves."
This was echoed in People v. Dasig (G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993), where robbery and murder during a New People's Army (NPA) operation were absorbed into rebellion.

Even under special laws, the doctrine persists. For instance, despite the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (codifying illegal possession of firearms), amended by RA 8294 and RA 10591, firearms used in rebellion are not separately charged if integral to the offense (People v. Ladonga, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005).

However, post-Hernandez developments include:

Republic Act No. 6968 (1990), which amended Article 135 to include coup d'etat as a distinct offense but retained rebellion's framework.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (RA 11479), which defines terrorism separately but explicitly states in Section 4 that rebellion or insurrection is not terrorism if committed as part of such acts. Nonetheless, common crimes in terrorism contexts may be prosecuted differently, but for pure rebellion cases, Hernandez applies.

Exceptions to Absorption: When Complexing or Separate Prosecution Applies

While absorption is the rule, exceptions exist:

Lack of Political Motivation: If the common crime is not in furtherance of rebellion (e.g., rape committed by a rebel for personal gratification), it is prosecuted separately (People v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-27481, October 30, 1970). The prosecution must prove the nexus—or lack thereof.
Crimes After Rebellion Ceases: Acts post-rebellion are not absorbed.
Special Laws with Higher Penalties: If a special law (e.g., RA 9165 on drugs) mandates separate prosecution, it may override absorption, though courts have been cautious.
International Humanitarian Law Contexts: In armed conflict scenarios involving rebels, common crimes may be treated as war crimes under RA 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law), but this is distinct from domestic penal law.
Amnesty or Pardon: Political offenders may receive amnesty (e.g., Proclamation No. 75 in 2010 for Moro rebels), which covers absorbed crimes but not unrelated ones.

Proving the political purpose is crucial; without it, acts may be charged as common crimes or terrorism.

Implications for Prosecution and Defense

The Hernandez doctrine streamlines prosecution by focusing on rebellion, avoiding fragmented trials. For defendants, it prevents multiple convictions and harsher penalties. However, it requires robust evidence of political intent, often leading to acquittals if unproven.

Critics argue it may under-punish heinous acts (e.g., mass killings), but the Court has maintained that legislative amendment is needed to change this, not judicial reinterpretation.

In practice, the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice apply this in charging decisions, as seen in cases against communist insurgents or Moro rebels.

Conclusion

Under Philippine penal law, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes when the latter are committed in furtherance of the rebellious purpose. The Hernandez doctrine, enshrined in jurisprudence, mandates absorption, treating such acts as inherent to rebellion. This upholds the political essence of the offense and prevents undue penal escalation. Exceptions apply where no nexus exists, allowing separate prosecutions. Until legislative reform alters this framework, the doctrine remains a cornerstone of criminal justice in rebellion cases, balancing state security with fair trial principles.