(General information only; not legal advice.)

1) “Buying stolen property” under Philippine criminal law: what case are you really facing?

In the Philippines, a criminal case involving the purchase or possession of stolen items is most commonly prosecuted as:

Fencing (P.D. No. 1612, the Anti-Fencing Law) – the usual charge when someone buys, receives, possesses, keeps, sells, disposes of, or otherwise deals in property derived from robbery or theft, with intent to gain, and with knowledge (actual or constructive) that it came from robbery/theft; or
Being an accessory under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) – a different theory where a person, after a felony has been committed, profits from the effects of the crime or assists the offender in dealing with the proceeds, without being a principal.

In practice, fencing is the more common and more dangerous charge for buyers of allegedly stolen goods because it is a special law with a powerful presumption and often heavier consequences.

2) Fencing (P.D. 1612) in plain terms

A. What the prosecution must prove (typical elements)

While cases are fact-specific, the prosecution generally needs to establish:

A robbery or theft actually occurred;
The property involved in the case is the same property taken in that robbery/theft;
The accused bought/received/possessed/kept/acquired/concealed/sold/disposed of/dealt with that property;
The accused acted with intent to gain; and
The accused knew or should have known the item came from robbery/theft (knowledge may be inferred from circumstances).

B. The “prima facie” presumption that drives many cases

P.D. 1612 provides that mere possession of an item that has been the subject of robbery or theft is prima facie evidence of fencing. In effect:

once the prosecution shows the item was stolen and the accused possessed it, the case can become “presumption-heavy,” and
the defense typically focuses on rebutting the presumption through credible explanation and proof of lawful acquisition or good faith.

This presumption does not automatically mean guilt, but it changes the practical dynamics: weak documentation and suspicious circumstances can become costly.

3) Why a fencing case becomes “long-pending”

A “long-pending” criminal case can happen at different stages:

Pre-information delay (complaint and preliminary investigation at the prosecutor’s office)
Post-information delay (case already filed in court but arraignment/trial keeps getting postponed)
Delay after arraignment (trial drags for years)
Dormant/archived cases (e.g., accused not arrested for long periods; court archives then revives)

Each stage raises different dismissal tools and different standards.

PART I — DISMISSAL GROUNDS THAT SPECIFICALLY MATTER IN “LONG-PENDING” CASES

4) Constitutional ground: right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases

Philippine law protects two related but distinct rights:

A. Right to speedy trial (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14[2])

This applies to criminal prosecutions in court. If the case is dragging unreasonably after it reaches the court phase—especially after arraignment—this right is central.

B. Right to speedy disposition of cases (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16)

This covers not only courts but also quasi-judicial and investigative processes—including preliminary investigation delays at the prosecutor’s office (and similar processes in other bodies).

C. How courts evaluate “inordinate delay” (the balancing approach)

Philippine jurisprudence typically assesses speedy trial/disposition claims using a balancing inquiry that looks at factors such as:

Length of delay (years-long delays trigger serious scrutiny)
Reasons for delay (court congestion vs. prosecution neglect vs. accused’s own motions)
Assertion of the right (did the accused timely invoke it, or only raised it when things turned unfavorable?)
Prejudice to the accused (anxiety, reputational harm, restrictions, costs; impairment of defense due to faded memories/lost witnesses)

Important practical point: If the record shows the delay was largely caused by the accused (repeated postponements, evasions, failure to appear), speedy-trial arguments weaken sharply.

D. Typical delay patterns that strengthen dismissal motions

Speedy trial/disposition arguments tend to be strongest when the long delay is linked to:

repeated prosecution absences or unpreparedness;
unexplained gaps (months/years) with no meaningful action by the prosecutor or court;
“resetting” the case multiple times without progress;
failure to serve notices/warrants properly that the State could reasonably have addressed;
prolonged preliminary investigation with no resolution despite complete submissions.

5) Statutory ground: Speedy Trial Act and Criminal Procedure rules (court-phase delays)

The Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. 8493) and related procedural rules set time frameworks for criminal proceedings (e.g., periods for arraignment, pre-trial, commencement of trial, and exclusions for certain delays). The key takeaway for dismissal is:

When delays violate the statutory framework and amount to a denial of the constitutional right, a motion to dismiss can prosper.
The law also recognizes excludable time (e.g., certain postponements for valid reasons), so the computation is not always “calendar-simple.”

In long-pending cases, the winning argument is rarely “a deadline was missed” alone; it is usually “the pattern of delay is unjustified and prejudicial.”

6) Prescription of the offense (statute of limitations): a powerful dismissal route if it applies

Prescription is a legal time bar: if the State fails to commence proceedings within the allowed period, the case can be dismissed.

A. Which prescription law applies depends on the charge

Fencing (P.D. 1612) is a special law offense, so prescription is generally governed by Act No. 3326 (unless a special law provides its own prescription rule).
If charged as an accessory under the RPC, prescription is governed by Articles 90–91 of the RPC (which tie prescription periods to penalty classifications under the Code).

B. Act No. 3326 (special laws): the usual time bands

Under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period generally depends on the maximum imposable imprisonment under the special law:

1 year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment not exceeding one month, or both
4 years for offenses punished by imprisonment of more than one month but less than two years
8 years for offenses punished by imprisonment of two years or more but less than six years
12 years for offenses punished by imprisonment of six years or more

Because fencing penalties vary by the value of the property involved, prescription analysis often begins by identifying the value alleged in the Information and the corresponding maximum penalty.

C. When does the prescriptive period start running?

Act No. 3326 generally provides that prescription runs from the day of commission of the violation, and if the violation is not known at the time, from discovery and institution of proceedings (applied in context).

D. What interrupts prescription?

In practice, prescription is typically interrupted by the institution of proceedings. For many criminal offenses, the filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation is commonly treated as interruptive in jurisprudence, and filing in court certainly is. The details can be technical, and the outcome can turn on:

exact dates of commission/discovery;
date complaint was filed with the prosecutor;
date information was filed in court;
whether proceedings were effectively pursued or were void/defective.

Core idea: A case can be “long-pending” in court and still not be prescribed if it was timely commenced; prescription is about when it started, not how long it lasted—though exceptional fact patterns can complicate this.

7) Provisional dismissal becoming permanent (Rule 117, Sec. 8): the “1 year / 2 years” trapdoor

Philippine criminal procedure allows provisional dismissal, but it is tightly regulated.

A case cannot be provisionally dismissed unless:

the accused gives express consent, and
the offended party is given notice.

If those conditions exist, and the case is not revived within the prescribed time, the dismissal becomes permanent:

1 year after the order of provisional dismissal for offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years
2 years after the order for offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 years

This ground is often overlooked but can be decisive in “revived after years” cases—especially where the case was once dismissed and later resurrected.

8) Failure to prosecute / repeated prosecution non-appearance / undue postponements

Courts can dismiss criminal cases where the prosecution repeatedly fails to proceed or is absent without justification. The key complications are:

whether the dismissal is with prejudice or without prejudice;
whether double jeopardy attaches (discussed below);
whether dismissal is framed as a sanction for failure to prosecute or as an enforcement of speedy trial rights.

Long-pending cases often accumulate a record of missed settings—this record is frequently the backbone of a strong dismissal motion.

PART II — DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND “WITH PREJUDICE” DISMISSALS

9) Why the timing of dismissal matters (arraignment is a critical milestone)

A recurring question in long-pending cases is whether the prosecution can just refile after dismissal.

Double jeopardy generally requires:

a valid complaint/information,
a court of competent jurisdiction,
the accused has been arraigned and entered a plea, and
the case is dismissed/acquittal occurs without the express consent of the accused (or dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal on the merits).

A. Dismissal on speedy trial grounds after arraignment

Dismissals that enforce the right to speedy trial/disposition are commonly treated as with prejudice in effect, and can bar refiling when they function as a definitive termination attributable to the State’s failure.

B. Dismissals that do not necessarily bar refiling

If dismissal happens before arraignment, double jeopardy typically does not attach, so refiling may still be possible (subject to prescription and other bars). Also, dismissals “without prejudice” may allow revival/refiling—again subject to the specific rule that applies (including provisional dismissal rules).

PART III — WHAT “DISMISSAL” LOOKS LIKE IN PRACTICE: THE MAIN MOTIONS

10) The workhorse: Motion to Dismiss (Rule 117)

In criminal cases, a Motion to Dismiss is the primary procedural vehicle when the defense claims the case should be thrown out due to legal defects or bars. Long-pendency grounds that commonly fit Rule 117 practice include:

denial of the right to speedy trial / speedy disposition;
prescription;
lack of jurisdiction;
defective information (when fatal);
double jeopardy (where applicable).

A strong motion is usually timeline-driven: it lays out dates, settings, resets, non-appearances, orders, and reasons attributable to the prosecution or the system.

11) Motion to Dismiss specifically invoking Speedy Trial / Speedy Disposition

These motions typically succeed when they show:

substantial length of time;
repeated unjustified postponements;
the accused asserted the right reasonably early;
concrete prejudice (including impaired defense).

12) Motion to Dismiss based on Provisional Dismissal (Rule 117, Sec. 8)

This is documentary:

show the provisional dismissal order,
show accused consent and notice to offended party,
show passage of 1 year or 2 years without revival within the allowable period.

13) Motion to Dismiss based on Prescription

This is computation-heavy:

determine the governing law (Act 3326 for P.D. 1612),
determine the maximum imposable penalty based on value alleged,
identify start date (commission/discovery context),
identify interruptive events (filing dates),
show that the period elapsed before valid institution of proceedings (or that proceedings were void/ineffective, when applicable).

PART IV — SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES THAT OFTEN INTERSECT WITH DISMISSAL STRATEGY

Long-pendency motions are procedural. But fencing cases also commonly collapse on the merits. Even if the case is not dismissed outright for delay, these issues frequently become decisive:

14) The prosecution must still prove the property was stolen (robbery/theft occurred)

A fencing conviction requires proof that:

a robbery or theft occurred, and
the item in the accused’s possession is linked to that robbery/theft.

Weak points often include:

poor identification of the item (generic items; no serial numbers; inconsistent descriptions);
absence of credible ownership proof;
chain-of-custody gaps for the recovered item;
reliance on hearsay rather than competent testimony.

If robbery/theft is not proven, fencing typically fails—presumption or not.

15) Rebutting the presumption: good faith and lawful acquisition

Because of the prima facie presumption, defenses frequently focus on showing that possession is consistent with lawful acquisition and lack of guilty knowledge, such as:

receipts, invoices, proof of payment and delivery;
credible identity of the seller and circumstances of sale;
purchase from legitimate businesses (registered pawnshops/retailers) with paperwork;
absence of “red flags” (unreasonably low price, rushed sale, tampered serial numbers, suspicious seller behavior);
prompt cooperation and consistent explanation.

Constructive knowledge (“should have known”) is often argued from the surrounding circumstances, so the defense usually aims to show the circumstances were not suspicious or that the buyer exercised ordinary prudence.

16) Intent to gain is commonly inferred—but not unstoppable

“Intent to gain” is often inferred from possession, resale attempts, or profit-making behavior. Defenses may challenge:

whether there was actual intent to profit (e.g., the item was for personal use, not resale);
whether any “gain” element is speculative;
whether the accused’s conduct is consistent with honest purchase.

17) Mistaken identity and online marketplace cases

Modern fencing prosecutions often arise from:

online sales, meetups, courier deliveries, marketplace chats;
“buy and sell” groups;
pawn transactions.

These cases can hinge on:

whether the accused is properly identified as the buyer/receiver;
authenticity and admissibility of screenshots/chats;
whether the item handed over is provably the stolen item;
whether intermediaries (riders, agents, friends) blur possession and knowledge.

PART V — SPECIAL LONG-PENDENCY SCENARIOS (AND WHY SOME DO NOT HELP)

18) “The case is old because I was not arrested for years”

If the accused was genuinely unaware and was not evading, delay arguments may still exist—especially if the State was negligent in serving processes. But if records show the accused was at large or evaded arrest, courts are less receptive to speedy-trial claims because the delay is not attributable to the State alone.

19) “The complainant stopped showing up”

Repeated non-appearance by the complainant/witnesses strengthens dismissal for failure to prosecute or speedy trial violations—especially when the prosecution cannot proceed without them. Still, outcomes vary:

some courts dismiss without prejudice early;
after arraignment, repeated prosecution failure can lead to dismissals that are effectively with prejudice, depending on the circumstances and the order’s basis.

20) “The case was archived, then revived”

Archiving often happens when the accused cannot be arrested or the case cannot proceed. Revival years later raises:

Rule 117 Sec. 8 issues if the earlier dismissal was provisional;
speedy trial/disposition analysis focusing on who caused the dormancy;
prejudice due to lost evidence/witness memory.

PART VI — PENALTIES AND WHY THEY MATTER FOR DISMISSAL

21) Penalty exposure under P.D. 1612 depends on value

Fencing penalties are graduated depending on the value of the property involved and can include imprisonment and fines. This matters because:

the severity influences how courts view prejudice and urgency;
the maximum imposable penalty influences prescription analysis (Act 3326) and provisional dismissal permanence timing (1 year vs 2 years).

PART VII — A PRACTICAL “DISMISSAL MAP” FOR LONG-PENDING FENCING CASES

22) If delay happened at the prosecutor’s office (preliminary investigation)

Most relevant ground: speedy disposition of cases (Constitution, Art. III Sec. 16). Key proof: filing date of complaint, dates of submissions, long gaps, resolution dates, reasons for delay.

23) If delay happened after the case reached court

Most relevant grounds:

speedy trial (Constitution, Art. III Sec. 14[2])
Speedy Trial Act / procedural timelines (with excludable periods considered)
failure to prosecute / repeated postponements Key proof: court minutes, orders resetting hearings, prosecution absences, long inactive periods.

24) If the case was once dismissed provisionally and revived late

Most relevant ground: Rule 117 Sec. 8 (provisional dismissal becoming permanent). Key proof: dismissal order, accused consent, notice to offended party, elapsed time before revival.

25) If the case was filed too late

Most relevant ground: prescription (Act 3326 for P.D. 1612). Key proof: offense date/discovery, filing date, interruptive events, penalty band.

26) Bottom line

A long-pending criminal case for buying stolen property is usually a fencing prosecution under P.D. 1612, and dismissal typically turns on a small set of high-impact doctrines:

Speedy disposition / speedy trial (constitutional, balancing test, prejudice and attribution of delay)
Prescription (Act 3326 for special laws; penalty-based time bars)
Provisional dismissal becoming permanent (Rule 117 Sec. 8’s 1-year/2-year rule)
Failure to prosecute and repeated unjustified postponements (often intertwined with speedy trial analysis)

Even when dismissal for delay is not granted, fencing cases frequently fail on the merits where the prosecution cannot firmly prove the underlying theft/robbery, cannot reliably link the property, or where the defense credibly rebuts the presumption through good faith and lawful acquisition evidence.