Election Cash-Withdrawal “Ban” in the Philippines

A comprehensive legal commentary on the origin, legal basis, jurisprudence, and present status of measures designed to regulate large cash withdrawals during Philippine election periods

I. Introduction

Vote-buying has long been the “original sin” of Philippine elections. Because the transaction is typically in cash and completed in the shadows, regulators have repeatedly looked to the banking system as a choke-point. What the media often calls a “cash-withdrawal ban” is in truth a rolling series of Comelec resolutions, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) circulars, and inter-agency memoranda that (1) require prior notice or post-withdrawal reporting of large cash transactions during the election period, or (2) encourage banks to treat those transactions as suspicious and file a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). No Philippine statute flat-out prohibits cash withdrawals in the run-up to election day; the controversy is whether Comelec may, by administrative fiat, compel banks to report or block them.

II. Statutory and Constitutional Framework

Source	Key Provision
1987 Constitution	Art. IX-C §2(1) – Comelec “shall enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of … elections.”
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)	§261(a) – Vote-buying and vote-selling are election offenses.
Bank Secrecy Law (R.A. 1405, as amended)	Deposits may be examined only with (a) written permission of depositor, (b) order of a competent court in criminal cases, or (c) impeachment/derivative exceptions.
Foreign Currency Deposit Act (R.A. 6426)	Extends absolute confidentiality to foreign-currency deposits.
General Banking Law (R.A. 8791)	Re-states secrecy; empowers BSP to supervise banks.
Anti-Money Laundering Act (R.A. 9160, as amended)	Cash transaction ≥ ₱500 000 in one banking day is a covered transaction (no suspicion required); banks must file a CTR. A transaction, of any amount, is an STR when the bank “knows, suspects or has reason to suspect” that funds are proceeds of an unlawful activity. Vote-buying per se is not yet listed as a predicate offense, but “bribery” is.

III. The 2013 Experiment – COMELEC Resolution No. 9688

Scope. Issued 23 March 2013 (mid-term polls), the resolution directed every bank and quasi-bank to “submit to the nearest Comelec field office, within 24 hours, a written report of any withdrawal or check encashment exceeding ₱100 000” by any one person.

Legal objections raised

Ultra vires – Comelec can enforce election laws, but cannot pierce bank secrecy without judicial process.
Violation of R.A. 1405/6426/8791 – The resolution neither (a) had a court order nor (b) obtained written consent.
Vagueness & overbreadth – Applied to every depositor, not just candidates or political parties.
Due-process concerns – No standards on use, storage, or destruction of data.

Supreme Court outcome Consolidated petitions by the Bankers Association of the Philippines, Chamber of Thrift Banks, Philippine Savings Bank, et al. led to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in April 2013 and a decision on the merits (G.R. Nos. 206844, 206982, 207182; 28 April 2015) striking the resolution down. The Court ruled:

> “COMELEC’s power to ‘administer’ elections cannot trump the express confidentiality commanded by R.A. 1405. Only Congress may create a new statutory exception, and only a court may compel disclosure in a pending case.”

The ruling remains the leading case on the limits of Comelec’s regulatory power vis-à-vis bank secrecy.

IV. 2016–2019: Shift to Reporting and Coordination

Chastened, Comelec abandoned blanket reporting and pivoted to inter-agency coordination:

2016 presidential election – The poll body asked the BSP to advise banks to “bring to Comelec’s attention” cash withdrawals ≥ ₱500 000 for individuals or ≥ ₱1 million for corporations during the election period. Compliance was voluntary and anonymised; banks could choose instead to file an STR with AMLC.
2019 mid-term election – A Corporate Circular Letter issued by BSP reiterated that banks must “enhance customer due diligence” and “immediately file STRs” where withdrawals appear linked to vote-buying. Comelec itself no longer required direct reporting to the Commission.

Because the Supreme Court decision did not void BSP’s supervisory authority under the General Banking Law, BSP-only reminders survived judicial scrutiny.

V. 2022 and the “₱500 K / ₱5 M” Notification Regime

For the 9 May 2022 national elections, Comelec, BSP, and AMLC signed a Tripartite Memorandum that essentially did three things:

Thresholds. Cash withdrawal ≥ ₱500 000 by an individual or ≥ ₱5 million by a corporation, from 22 April to 9 May 2022, must trigger internal bank alerts.
STR route preferred. Banks should route information through AMLC (which can legally receive it) rather than Comelec.
No outright prohibition. Neither Comelec nor BSP barred the withdrawal itself; the measure was purely risk-based monitoring.

Comelec spokesman James Jimenez clarified in press briefings that there was “no ban on large withdrawals,” only “heightened surveillance.”

VI. 2023–Present: Digital Money and Legislative Proposals

A. The digital-wallet challenge

Vote-buying has migrated to e-money platforms (G-Cash, Maya, Coins.ph) that allow rapid transfers under the ₱50 000-per-day wallet limit—well below AMLC’s covered-transaction threshold. Investigators must now rely on suspicious rather than covered transaction reports, which require banks and e-money issuers to subjectively spot red flags (bulk account opening, round-figure cash-ins, rapid cash-outs, etc.).

B. Pending bills

Several House and Senate bills (e.g., House Bill 8991, 19th Cong.) propose to:

add vote-buying and vote-selling as predicate offenses under AMLA, allowing AMLC to freeze assets ex-parte;
lower the CTR trigger from ₱500 000 to ₱100 000 during election periods;
expressly authorize Comelec to request bank information through AMLC, thereby side-stepping the 2015 Supreme Court ruling.

None has become law as of May 2025.

VII. Critical Assessment

Issue	Arguments For Regulation	Arguments Against / Limitations
Constitutional authority	Art. IX-C empowers Comelec to ensure “free, orderly, honest” polls. Vote-buying directly undermines this.	Bank secrecy enjoys statutory protection; SC has ruled administrative agencies cannot unilaterally pierce it.
Effectiveness	Large withdrawals correlate with cash pay-outs near election day; reporting may deter candidates.	Vote-buying often disbursed in advances or thru intermediaries; can be chunked into sub-threshold withdrawals or digital cash.
Privacy & commerce	Narrow windows, high thresholds, STR confidentiality mitigate privacy harm.	Reporting all ≥ ₱100 000 withdrawals (2013 model) captures ordinary payroll and supplier payments, chilling commerce.
Enforcement capacity	AMLC analytics + bank CTR/STR data create audit trail if information-sharing is seamless.	Comelec lacks forensic accounting expertise; AMLC caseload already heavy; enforcement rarely ripens into convictions.

VIII. Practical Take-Aways for Lawyers, Banks, and Candidates

There is no statutory or regulatory provision that flatly forbids a depositor from withdrawing cash during elections.
Banks must maintain heightened diligence—they remain liable under AMLA for failure to file an STR when circumstances warrant.
Comelec cannot subpoena bank records on its own; it must secure a court order or route the request through AMLC.
Candidates and treasurers should keep meticulous accounts. Under the Omnibus Election Code and the Fair Election Act (R.A. 9006), they must file a Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). Unexplained bulk cash movements invite disqualification.
Digital-cash transfers are not exempt. E-money issuers are “covered institutions” under AMLA; high-volume election-period transfers are STR red flags.

IX. Conclusion

What Philippine headlines loosely call the “election cash-withdrawal ban” is not, and never has been, a true prohibition. It is a moving patchwork of administrative measures that—so far—stop at monitoring, reporting, and intelligence-sharing. The 2015 Supreme Court decision clipped Comelec’s wings, forcing regulators to work within the bank-secrecy carve-outs already recognized by statute. Whether Congress will eventually amend AMLA to elevate vote-buying into a predicate offense—and thereby give AMLC full investigative reach—remains the critical hinge on which future reforms will turn.

Suggested Citations (for further reading)

Chamber of Thrift Banks, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 206844, 206982, 207182, 28 April 2015.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9688 (23 March 2013).
BSP Circular Letter to All Banks re Election-Related Transactions (15 February 2016).
Tripartite Memorandum of Agreement (Comelec-BSP-AMLC) on Monitoring Large Withdrawals (22 April 2022).
Republic Act 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act), as amended by R.A. 10927, 11521.

Prepared 16 May 2025, Manila, Philippines.