Philippine Constitutional and Administrative Law Perspective

I. Introduction

In Philippine constitutional law, one of the subtler but recurring themes is this: Do the fundamental powers of the State need to be granted by the Constitution, or do they exist even if the Constitution says nothing about them? And if these powers are “inherent,” how can they be validly granted or delegated to other organs (local governments, agencies, GOCCs) when there is no explicit constitutional text that says, “You shall have police power,” or “You shall exercise eminent domain”?

This question is often framed in exams or discussions as “Granting of inherent powers without constitutional provision.” The idea is to explore how the State, and its various instrumentalities, can exercise the inherent powers of sovereignty—police power, eminent domain, and taxation—even if the Constitution is silent or speaks only in general terms.

II. Inherent Powers of the State: Basic Concepts

Classically, Philippine public law identifies three inherent powers of the State:

Police Power – the power to enact and enforce laws to promote public health, morals, safety, and general welfare.
Power of Eminent Domain – the power to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
Power of Taxation – the power to impose burdens (taxes, duties, fees) upon persons, property, or activities for public purposes.

They are called “inherent” because they belong to the State by virtue of sovereignty itself. They are not created by the Constitution; they exist whether or not a Constitution is written. The Constitution may:

Recognize them
Regulate them
Limit them
Distribute or allocate their exercise

…but it is not their source in the philosophical or public law sense.

From this starting point, two important principles follow:

The national government (as the juridical embodiment of the State) is presumed to possess these powers even without an express constitutional grant.
Local government units, administrative agencies, and other entities do not have inherent powers; they derive their authority only by delegation—from the Constitution, from statute, or both.

III. The Constitutional Framework in the Philippines

The 1987 Constitution does not compile the inherent powers in one neat provision, but it refers to them across several articles:

Taxation:
- Art. VI, Sec. 28 recognizes Congress’s power to “evolve a progressive system of taxation,” subject to limitations (uniformity, equity, etc.).
- Art. X, Sec. 5 grants LGUs the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to guidelines and limitations provided by Congress.
Eminent Domain:
- Art. III, Sec. 9 (Bill of Rights) presupposes the existence of eminent domain by providing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
- Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights) and Art. XII (National Economy and Patrimony) assume the use of eminent domain for agrarian reform, urban land reform, and other social justice measures.
Police Power:
- There is no article that says “the State shall have police power,” yet the entire structure of the Constitution—from the Preamble to the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Art. II)—presupposes its existence (maintenance of peace and order, promotion of the common good, protection of life, liberty, and property, etc.).

Thus, taxation and eminent domain are directly spoken of, while police power is more implicit. But all three are conceptually treated as inherent in sovereignty, with the Constitution acting as a charter of limitations and frameworks of exercise, not as a pure grant.

IV. The Core Doctrine: Constitution as a Limitation, Not a Grant

Philippine jurisprudence frequently echoes a U.S.-inspired principle:

The Constitution of the Philippines is not a grant of power but a limitation upon the powers of government.

This is crucial. It means:

The legislative power of Congress under Art. VI, Sec. 1 is described as “plenary,” subject only to constitutional limitations.
By extension, the exercise of the inherent powers of the State does not require a specific constitutional clause saying, “You may exercise police power in situation X.” Instead, what matters is whether the exercise violates any constitutional limitation, such as due process, equal protection, non-impairment of contracts, and the like.

So, as to the national government, one need not look for a specific constitutional provision as the “source” of police power, eminent domain, or taxation. They exist simply because the Philippines is a sovereign State.

V. Granting or Delegating Inherent Powers to Other Entities

Where things become more intricate is when entities other than the State itself—like local government units (LGUs) and administrative agencies—are allowed to exercise powers that are inherently sovereign.

These entities have no inherent powers. They can only act by delegation. The key questions then are:

Can they be given authority to exercise inherent powers without an explicit constitutional grant?
If yes, what is the legal basis—and what are the limits?

Let’s break that down.

A. Congress: Plenary Power and the Ability to Delegate

Congress, under Art. VI, Sec. 1, is vested with legislative power. This legislative power includes the authority to structure government, create public corporations, establish LGUs, and define their powers, unless prohibited by the Constitution.

Because the inherent powers “reside” in the State, and the State acts largely through the legislature, Congress may delegate aspects of police power, eminent domain, and taxation to other instrumentalities, subject to:

Constitutional limitations; and
Certain doctrinal controls on delegation (e.g., completeness test and sufficient standard test).

This delegation can occur even if there is no specific constitutional clause that mentions those particular entities, as long as:

The Constitution does not forbid such delegation; and
The delegation complies with general constitutional principles (due process, equal protection, etc.).

B. Local Government Units (LGUs)

LGUs are a special case because the Constitution itself speaks of local autonomy and taxing power (Art. X). But their exercise of inherent powers is still largely statutory in implementation.

Police Power of LGUs
- The Constitution does not say: “Cities and municipalities shall have police power.”
- Instead, the Local Government Code (LGC) gives them authority, notably via the General Welfare Clause (commonly in Sec. 16), empowering them to enact ordinances necessary and proper to promote the general welfare.
- This is widely understood as a delegation of police power from Congress to LGUs.
Even though there is no specific constitutional “police power clause” for LGUs, the combination of:
- (a) Congress’s general legislative power, and
- (b) the constitutional encouragement of local autonomy provides enough basis for Congress to grant LGUs broad police power by statute.
Power of Eminent Domain for LGUs
- The Constitution does not list LGUs as eminent domain holders.
- However, the LGC expressly authorizes LGUs to exercise eminent domain, subject to conditions (ordinance, public purpose, just compensation, etc.).
- This is still valid because the eminent domain power originates from the State, and Congress, as the State’s lawmaking organ, may allocate it to LGUs by law. No specific constitutional text naming LGUs is needed, so long as constitutional limits (just compensation, public use) are honored.
Taxing Power of LGUs
- Here, the Constitution is more specific: Art. X, Sec. 5 gives LGUs the power to create sources of revenue and levy taxes, subject to limitations Congress may provide.
- But the actual mechanics of taxation—what taxes, how much, on whom—are fleshed out by statute (LGC and special laws).
Thus, even though LGUs do not have “inherent” taxation power in the sovereign sense, they can validly exercise a portion of the State’s taxing power by virtue of constitutional recognition plus statutory delegation.

C. Administrative Agencies and Regulatory Bodies

Administrative agencies (e.g., regulatory commissions, specialized boards) also do not possess inherent powers. Their powers must be:

Expressly granted by law; or
Necessarily implied from the express powers given.

Yet these express powers very often derive from inherent powers of the State. Examples:

Licensing and regulatory powers (e.g., to regulate public utilities, professions, securities markets) are manifestations of delegated police power.
Authority to impose certain regulatory fees or charges can be an aspect of taxation (though courts often distinguish taxes from license fees).
Some agencies (e.g., certain infrastructure or housing agencies in specific statutes) may be authorized to expropriate property, which is an exercise of delegated eminent domain.

Again, no specific constitutional clause is needed to mention “Agency X shall have police power.” It suffices that:

Congress has the inherent authority to regulate for the general welfare;
Congress creates the agency and vests it with particular powers; and
Such delegation passes the tests of completeness and sufficient standard (the law must be complete in itself when it leaves Congress, and must provide an intelligible standard to guide the delegate).

D. Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Public Corporations

GOCCs and other public entities sometimes exercise eminent domain, collect fees, or enforce regulations. Their powers depend entirely on their charters (special laws or the GOCC Governance Act framework).

If a charter expressly authorizes a GOCC to expropriate, it is considered a delegation of eminent domain by Congress.
If the charter empowers it to set and collect fees or charges, that may be understood as an exercise of delegated taxing or regulatory power, depending on purpose and structure.

Again, the validity does not hinge on the existence of a specific constitutional provision naming that GOCC; it rests on the inherent powers of the State, plenary legislative power, and statutory delegation.

VI. “Without Constitutional Provision”: What Exactly Does That Mean?

The phrase “without constitutional provision” can be understood in several ways, each with different implications:

No explicit constitutional grant to a specific organ, e.g., no “police power clause” for LGUs or agencies.
- In this sense, exercise of the power can still be valid because of inherent State power and statutory delegation.
Constitutional silence on a particular modality of exercising an inherent power.
- Example: A new kind of tax or regulation not foreseen by the framers.
- The State may still impose it via statute, as long as no constitutional limitation is violated, because inherent powers are flexible and adaptive.
Total constitutional silence on the inherent power itself.
- Even if the Constitution never mentioned “police power,” the State would still possess it as a basic incident of sovereignty.
- The enforcement of criminal laws, health and sanitation regulations, zoning and land use controls, etc., would still be justified on the basis of inherent police power, limited only by the Bill of Rights and other substantive constraints.

In all these senses, “without constitutional provision” does not automatically mean “without legal basis.” It might simply mean that:

The basis is inherent sovereignty, implemented through statute and general constitutional structure, rather than through a specific “grant clause.”

VII. Constitutional and Jurisprudential Limitations on Grant and Exercise

Even if inherent powers can be exercised and delegated without specific constitutional grants, they remain subject to strict boundaries, both substantive and procedural.

A. Limitations on Police Power

Police power legislation and delegated measures must generally:

Serve a legitimate public purpose (public health, safety, morals, or general welfare);
Be reasonably related to that purpose (rational connection test);
Comply with substantive due process (not arbitrary or oppressive); and
Respect equal protection, unless a valid classification is shown.

Local ordinances or administrative regulations that go beyond what is reasonable, or that undermine rights with no adequate public purpose, may be struck down despite the broad latitude usually granted to police power measures.

B. Limitations on Eminent Domain

Whenever the State or a delegate (LGU, agency, GOCC) exercises eminent domain, it must satisfy:

Taking – there must be a taking, damaging, or deprivation of property.
Public Use – the expropriation must serve a public purpose or public use (Philippine jurisprudence interprets “public use” broadly, including social justice measures like agrarian reform).
Just Compensation – the owner must receive just compensation, generally understood as the fair market value at the time of taking.
Due Process – proper procedures must be followed (notice, hearing where applicable).

Delegates cannot redefine “public use” in a way that is clearly self-serving, or circumvent just compensation. If they do, their enabling statute or specific action may be struck down as unconstitutional, again not because they lack a constitutional grant, but because their exercise violates constitutional limitations.

C. Limitations on Taxation

The power to tax is described as the “power to destroy”, but it is constrained by:

Uniformity and equity (taxes must be uniform and equitable);
Due process and equal protection;
Non-impairment of contracts;
Prohibition of confiscatory taxation;
Specific constitutional exemptions (e.g., charitable institutions, churches in certain contexts, etc.);
Allocation of taxing powers among levels of government per the Constitution and statutes.

Even in the absence of a specific constitutional clause on a particular tax, the validity of the tax is tested against these general limitations. Delegated taxing power (e.g., to LGUs) must also fall within statutory bounds and constitutional constraints.

D. Delegation Doctrines: Completeness and Sufficient Standard

When Congress grants an inherent power to an agency, LGU, or GOCC, the enabling law must satisfy:

Completeness Test – The law must be complete in all essential terms, leaving to the delegate only the task of filling in details.
Sufficient Standard Test – The law must provide an intelligible standard that guides the delegate’s exercise of the power (e.g., “to protect public health,” “to regulate in the interest of consumers,” “for the promotion of the general welfare”).

So even when there is no explicit constitutional provision naming the delegate, the validity of the grant is measured against these tests. If the standard is vague or the law is incomplete, the delegation risks being struck down as undue delegation of legislative power, regardless of the inherent nature of the power involved.

VIII. Implications and Practical Examples

To make the doctrine more concrete, consider typical Philippine scenarios:

A City Ordinance Penalizing Certain Businesses Near Schools
- No constitutional clause says, “City of X shall have police power.”
- But under the LGC’s general welfare clause (statutory delegation of police power), and under Congress’s plenary power, the city can validly enact such an ordinance if it is reasonable and related to public welfare.
A GOCC Expropriating Land for a Public Infrastructure Project
- The Constitution does not mention this GOCC by name.
- Its charter, however, grants it authority to expropriate property necessary for its mandate.
- As long as the project is for public use and just compensation is paid, the expropriation is an exercise of delegated eminent domain.
A Regulatory Commission Imposing License Fees on Public Utilities
- The Constitution does not give that commission taxing power.
- Its enabling statute authorizes it to regulate utilities and to impose reasonable license fees.
- Courts will ask whether the fee is regulatory (police power) or revenue-raising (taxation) and whether the law provides a sufficient standard. The validity turns on statutory and constitutional limits, not on the existence of a specific constitutional grant to the commission.

In all these, the absence of an explicit constitutional provision granting the particular power to the specific body does not doom the measure. What matters is:

The inherent power belongs to the State;
Congress has validly delegated aspects of that power; and
The exercise of that power complies with constitutional and statutory constraints.

IX. Contested or Gray Areas

There are, however, some zones of tension:

Over-expansive Delegations – When a statute gives extremely broad, open-ended powers to an agency or LGU with minimal standards, critics argue that this effectively allows the delegate to define its own powers, which may violate the non-delegation doctrine.
Blurred Lines Between Police Power and Eminent Domain – Measures that substantially deprive an owner of beneficial use of property (e.g., heavy restrictions, development freezes) may look like “regulation” but function as “taking,” raising the question whether just compensation is required.
Tax vs. Regulatory Fee – When a so-called “fee” is large and revenue-oriented, courts might treat it as a tax. If imposed by an entity without delegated taxing authority, it may be invalid.

Yet even in these gray areas, the doctrinal anchor remains: we are not debating the existence of the inherent power, but rather its proper limits, characterization, and the validity of its delegation and exercise.

X. Conclusion

In the Philippine setting, the inherent powers of the State—police power, eminent domain, and taxation—do not depend on explicit constitutional provisions for their existence. They arise from sovereignty itself. The Constitution mainly recognizes and restricts them, rather than creates them.

Because these powers are inherent, their exercise by the State does not require a specific constitutional grant. At the same time, no other organ—whether an LGU, an administrative agency, or a GOCC—may validly exercise them unless authorized by law (and, where required, by the Constitution). That authorization is subject to:

Substantive constraints (public purpose, just compensation, due process, equal protection, non-impairment, etc.); and
Structural limits (non-delegation doctrine, completeness and sufficient standard tests, constitutional distribution of powers).

Thus, “granting of inherent powers without constitutional provision” is not a paradox but a statement of a deeper constitutional philosophy:

The State already possesses these powers by nature.
The Constitution restrains and channels them.
Congress allocates and delegates them to various organs.

The legality of such grants does not rest on a micromanaging constitutional text, but on whether the delegation flows from inherent sovereignty, is conferred by valid statute, and is exercised within the boundaries drawn by the Constitution and the rule of law.