I. Preliminary Distinctions: Void ab Initio Marriages, Voidable Marriages, and the Absence of Divorce

The Philippines remains the only country in the world (aside from the Vatican) without absolute divorce for the majority of its citizens. Marriages can only be terminated or declared inexistent through (1) declaration of nullity under Articles 35–54 of the Family Code (void ab initio) or (2) annulment of voidable marriages under Articles 45–47.

The grounds are strictly limited by law and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that these grounds are numerus clausus — only those enumerated by law are allowed. Courts cannot create new grounds even if the marriage has irretrievably broken down.

II. Infertility/Sterility as a Ground for Annulment: Settled Doctrine That It Is NOT a Ground

A. Article 45(5): Physical Incapacity to Consummate, Not to Procreate

Article 45(5) of the Family Code provides:

“The marriage may be annulled if either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable.”

The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that this refers exclusively to impotency (impotentia copulandi) — the physical inability to perform the sexual act — and NOT to sterility/infertility (impotentia generandi) — the inability to procreate.

Leading cases:

Jimenez v. Republic (G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960)
The wife had infantile uterus and incomplete ovaries, making her permanently sterile. The Supreme Court explicitly held: “Sterility alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage under Philippine law.” The petition was denied.
Sarao v. Guevarra (G.R. No. L-11066, September 30, 1958, reiterated in numerous subsequent cases)
Sterility, even if permanent and incurable, does not render the marriage voidable.
Alcazar v. Alcazar (G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009)
Reaffirmed that Article 45(5) covers only impotence coeundi, not sterility.

B. Concealment of Infertility Is Not Fraud Under Article 46

Article 46 enumerates only four specific instances of fraud that vitiate consent:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Concealment of pregnancy by another man at the time of marriage
(3) Concealment of a sexually transmissible disease
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality, or lesbianism

Concealment of sterility/infertility is conspicuously absent from the list. The Supreme Court has ruled that the enumeration is exclusive.

Cases:

Anaya v. Palaroan (G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970)
“The fraud contemplated by law must be one of those specifically listed in Article 86 of the Civil Code [now Article 46 of the Family Code]. Concealment of sterility is not included.”
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006)
Reaffirmed the exclusive character of the enumeration.

Therefore, even deliberate concealment of infertility (e.g., prior hysterectomy, azoospermia, Turner syndrome, etc.) before marriage does NOT constitute legal fraud and cannot be used as a ground for annulment.

C. Exception: When Infertility Is Caused by a Serious, Incurable Sexually Transmissible Disease

If the infertility results from a serious and incurable STD existing at the time of marriage and concealed, then Article 45(6) + Article 46(3) may apply. Example: untreated HIV or advanced chlamydia causing irreversible tubal blockage or epididymitis. But the ground is the concealed STD itself, not the resulting infertility.

D. Summary on Infertility

Philippine law treats procreation as an important end of marriage (Article 1, Family Code) but NOT as an essential element for its validity. A marriage between two permanently sterile persons is perfectly valid and cannot be annulled on that ground alone. This position has remained unchanged since the Civil Code era and was carried over into the 1988 Family Code.

III. Lack of Independent Decision-Making as a Possible Ground

There is no explicit ground called “lack of independent decision-making.” However, petitioners sometimes attempt to frame it under several existing grounds:

A. Force, Intimidation, or Undue Influence (Article 45(4))

Article 45(4):

“That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence…”

The influence must be of such gravity that it destroyed the party’s free will — the person would not have married but for the pressure.

Jurisprudence is strict:

People v. Santiago (G.R. No. L-27972, October 29, 1927, old but still cited)
Mere moral persuasion or parental advice is insufficient.
Ruiz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003)
Threat of disinheritance or family disgrace usually does not rise to the level of undue influence unless accompanied by grave fear.
Cases involving shotgun marriages or extreme familial pressure have occasionally succeeded, but only when the petitioner proves that the fear was grave and unjust (e.g., credible threat of physical harm or severe economic abandonment).

In practice, this ground is rarely granted for adults of sound mind. The Supreme Court has said that “respect for parental authority” or “fear of disappointing parents” does not vitiate consent.

B. Unsoundness of Mind (Article 45(2))

If the party was completely incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of marriage at the time of celebration (e.g., severe intellectual disability, acute psychosis), the marriage is voidable.

However, mere weakness of intellect, low IQ, or dependent personality traits do not suffice unless the person was truly incapable of giving valid consent.

C. Psychological Incapacity Under Article 36 (Declaration of Nullity, Not Annulment Proper)

This is the most commonly invoked (and most abused) ground when petitioners claim one spouse was incapable of making independent decisions.

Article 36:

“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall also be void from the beginning…”

The Supreme Court’s controlling doctrines are:

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997) – the Molina guidelines (8 requirements, all must be present)
Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995) – psychological incapacity must be grave, juridical antecedent, and incurable
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te (G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009) – liberalized slightly but still requires clinical proof
Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio (G.R. No. 171042, June 30, 2008) and later cases – personality disorders must be shown to be clinically rooted and incapacitating

Cases where “lack of independent decision-making” was argued:

Dependent Personality Disorder or extreme submissiveness is almost never sufficient by itself. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions based on “mere difficulty” or “neglect” rather than total incapacity.
Kalaw v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, reiterated in Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021)
The Court clarified that psychological incapacity is not mere irresponsibility, refusal to work, or even infidelity. It must render the party completely unable to perform the essential obligations (mutual love, respect, fidelity, support, and — for some justices — procreation).
Castillo v. Republic (G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017)
A wife who was allegedly “controlled by her mother” throughout the marriage was denied nullity because the incapacity was not shown to be grave and antecedent.

There is currently no Supreme Court decision granting nullity based solely or primarily on “lack of independent decision-making” or extreme dependency without accompanying severe personality disorder (e.g., borderline, narcissistic, or antisocial personality disorder with clear clinical evidence).

In practice, trial courts sometimes grant petitions on this theory, but the Office of the Solicitor General almost always appeals, and the Supreme Court reverses the vast majority (over 90% reversal rate for Article 36 cases in the last decade).

IV. Practical Consequences and Advice

Infertility, even if known to one party and deliberately concealed, is never a ground for annulment or nullity in Philippine law (2025).
Lack of independent decision-making is only successful under Article 45(4) when there is proof of grave fear or intimidation, or under Article 36 when rooted in a clinically diagnosed severe personality disorder that meets the Molina/Tan-Andal criteria.
Petitioners who file on these theories almost invariably fail on appeal unless accompanied by overwhelming psychiatric evidence and corroboration that the incapacity existed at the time of marriage and was grave and incurable.
The high evidentiary burden and the Supreme Court’s increasingly strict interpretation of Article 36 (especially post-Tan-Andal in 2021) make success extremely difficult.

Philippine law prioritizes the permanence and indissolubility of marriage over individual reproductive capacity or personal autonomy in decision-making once valid consent has been given. These grounds, as presently understood, offer virtually no relief for the situations described.