Introduction

In the realm of constitutional and political reforms, the establishment of public consultation mechanisms serves as a cornerstone for democratic governance. The Kenya Commission for Public Views, initiated in 1990, exemplifies such an effort amid pressures for political liberalization in post-colonial Africa. This article examines the commission's formation, objectives, proceedings, outcomes, and implications, while drawing parallels to similar processes in the Philippine legal framework. By contextualizing this Kenyan initiative within Philippine jurisprudence, particularly in light of the country's own history of constitutional commissions and public participation in lawmaking, we can glean valuable insights into the role of citizen engagement in shaping national policies.

The Philippine Constitution of 1987 emphasizes people power and public participation, as seen in provisions like Article II, Section 23, which mandates the state to encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations to promote the welfare of the nation. This mirrors the consultative ethos of the Kenyan commission, offering a lens through which Filipino legal scholars and policymakers can evaluate mechanisms for inclusive governance.

Historical Background and Formation

The Kenya Commission for Public Views emerged against a backdrop of mounting domestic and international pressure on the Kenyan government under President Daniel arap Moi. By 1990, Kenya had been a one-party state since 1969, with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) holding monopoly power. Economic stagnation, corruption allegations, and human rights abuses fueled demands for multi-party democracy. In July 1990, following riots in Nairobi and calls from opposition figures, religious leaders, and civil society, President Moi appointed a review committee to solicit public opinions on the political system.

Officially termed the "Review Committee" but commonly referred to as the Commission for Public Views, it was chaired by Vice President George Saitoti. The committee comprised 22 members, including government officials, KANU loyalists, and a few independent voices. Its mandate was initially narrow—focusing on the controversial "queue voting" system (mlolongo), where voters lined up behind candidates instead of secret balloting—but quickly expanded to encompass broader views on governance, including the one-party system.

In Philippine context, this formation resonates with the establishment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention under President Ferdinand Marcos, which was tasked with revising the 1935 Constitution amid calls for reform. However, unlike the Kenyan commission, which was executive-appointed and ad hoc, the Philippine convention was elected, reflecting Article XVII of the 1935 Constitution on amendments. The Kenyan model's top-down approach highlights potential pitfalls in public consultations, such as bias toward the ruling regime, a concern also evident in Philippine history during the Martial Law era when public input was often manipulated.

Objectives and Scope

The primary objective of the commission was to gather public sentiments on political reforms to ostensibly guide government policy. It invited submissions from citizens, organizations, and experts on topics such as electoral processes, party systems, human rights, and economic policies. Public hearings were held across Kenya's provinces, allowing ordinary Kenyans to voice grievances against authoritarianism.

Key areas of inquiry included:

The viability of the one-party state versus multi-partyism.
Reforms to the electoral system to ensure fairness and secrecy.
Measures to curb executive overreach and enhance judicial independence.
Socio-economic issues intertwined with politics, such as land distribution and tribalism.

From a Philippine perspective, these objectives align with the mandates of the 1986 Constitutional Commission appointed by President Corazon Aquino following the People Power Revolution. Under Republic Act No. 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act), the Philippines institutionalized public participation in lawmaking, allowing citizens to propose amendments via initiative. The Kenyan commission's scope, though limited by its non-binding nature, prefigures such mechanisms, underscoring the importance of Article XIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which promotes the right of the people to participate in decision-making processes.

Proceedings and Public Engagement

The commission's proceedings spanned several months, from August to December 1990, involving over 30 public meetings and thousands of submissions. Citizens testified on experiences of political repression, with notable inputs from figures like opposition leader Kenneth Matiba and church leaders. However, the process was marred by intimidation, with reports of arrests and disruptions by KANU supporters.

Despite these challenges, the commission collected a wealth of data, revealing overwhelming public support for multi-party democracy (over 80% of submissions favored it) and electoral reforms. The proceedings highlighted the tension between state control and genuine consultation, a dynamic familiar in Philippine legal history. For instance, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, public hearings were integral, leading to provisions like Article VI, Section 1, vesting legislative power in Congress but subject to people's initiative.

In terms of legal procedure, the Kenyan commission operated without a statutory framework, relying on executive decree, which contrasts with the Philippines' more formalized approaches under laws like Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which outlines rules for public consultations in rulemaking.

Outcomes and Impact

The commission submitted its report in December 1990, recommending the retention of the one-party system but with reforms to queue voting and greater freedoms. These recommendations were largely ignored by the government, which viewed the exercise as a stalling tactic. However, the process galvanized opposition, contributing to the repeal of Section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution in 1991, allowing multi-party elections in 1992.

The limited impact underscores the non-binding nature of such commissions, a lesson for Philippine jurisprudence. In the Philippines, outcomes of public consultations have had varying enforceability; for example, the 2005 Consultative Commission on Charter Change under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo proposed federalism but failed due to political opposition, echoing the Kenyan experience. Under Philippine law, such as in People v. Comelec (G.R. No. 127325, 1997), the Supreme Court has emphasized that public participation must be meaningful, not merely ceremonial.

Long-term, the 1990 commission laid groundwork for Kenya's later constitutional reforms, including the 2000 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission and the 2010 Constitution. This evolutionary aspect offers parallels to the Philippines' iterative constitutional processes, from the 1935 to 1987 charters, emphasizing adaptability in response to public views.

Legal Implications and Lessons for the Philippines

Analyzing the Kenya Commission for Public Views through Philippine legal lenses reveals several implications:

Constitutional Entrenchment of Participation: The Philippine Constitution's explicit provisions for public involvement (e.g., Article II, Section 25 on local autonomy) provide a stronger foundation than Kenya's 1990 ad hoc approach, reducing risks of manipulation.
Judicial Oversight: Philippine courts, as in Santiago v. Comelec (G.R. No. 127325, 1997), have invalidated flawed consultative processes, suggesting a model for ensuring accountability in similar Kenyan-style commissions.
Challenges of Implementation: Both contexts illustrate how executive dominance can undermine public views, as seen in Philippine cases like the aborted 2006 People's Initiative for Charter Change.
Comparative Reform Strategies: Filipino policymakers could adopt elements of the Kenyan commission's broad scoping while ensuring binding mechanisms, perhaps through amendments to RA 6735 to strengthen referenda.

In essence, the 1990 Kenyan commission represents a pivotal, albeit flawed, experiment in public-driven reform. For the Philippines, with its robust tradition of people power, it serves as a cautionary tale and inspirational blueprint for enhancing democratic inclusivity.

Conclusion

The Kenya Commission for Public Views of 1990, though short-lived in direct impact, symbolizes the global struggle for participatory governance. In Philippine context, it reinforces the value of constitutional safeguards for public engagement, ensuring that voices from the grassroots translate into tangible legal reforms. As both nations continue to evolve their political systems, the lessons from this commission remain relevant, advocating for transparency, inclusivity, and enforceability in all consultative endeavors.