Labor Rights and Hazard Pay of Hospital Security Guards During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines


I. Introduction

When COVID-19 hit the Philippines in early 2020, hospitals became the epicenters of risk. Public attention focused, understandably, on doctors, nurses, and other health professionals. But at every hospital gate stood another set of frontliners: security guards.

They screened visitors, enforced mask and distancing rules, controlled entry of patients, escorted bodies, and often faced confused, angry or grieving relatives. They were exposed to the same infectious environment, sometimes with less training and weaker bargaining power than regular hospital staff.

This article surveys, from a Philippine legal perspective, the rights of hospital security guards in relation to hazard pay during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the broader web of labor and social protection laws that affect them.


II. Legal Status of Hospital Security Guards

A. Triangular Employment Relationship

In most cases, a hospital security guard is not directly employed by the hospital. The typical structure is:

  1. Principal – the hospital (public or private), which needs security services.
  2. Security Agency – a private contractor engaged to provide guards.
  3. Security Guard – formally employed by the security agency, assigned to the hospital.

This triangular arrangement is governed mainly by:

  • The Labor Code of the Philippines (PD 442, as amended);
  • DOLE regulations on contracting/subcontracting (notably Department Order No. 174-17);
  • DOLE rules specific to the security service industry; and
  • The general principles on legitimate job contracting vs. labor-only contracting.

For legitimate job contracting:

  • The security agency is the employer of the guards;
  • The hospital, as principal, is solidarily liable with the security agency for labor law violations relating to wage and monetary benefits for the duration of the service contract.

For labor-only contracting (where the contractor has no substantial capital or investment, and simply supplies workers):

  • The hospital can be deemed the direct employer, with all the attendant obligations.

In practice, most security agencies are treated as legitimate contractors, but the principal’s solidary liability still matters when guards claim unpaid wages, benefits, or hazard pay stipulated in contracts.

B. Basic Labor Standards Entitlements

Hospital security guards, as employees, are entitled at least to:

  • Minimum wage as per applicable regional wage orders;
  • Overtime pay (work beyond 8 hours);
  • Night shift differential and holiday premium pay;
  • Service incentive leaves (if applicable);
  • 13th month pay;
  • SSS, PhilHealth, Pag-IBIG contributions;
  • Benefits under the Employees’ Compensation (EC) program for work-related sickness, disability or death.

None of these, by themselves, automatically guarantee hazard pay. Hazard pay is a distinct concept.


III. Concept of Hazard Pay in Philippine Law

A. General Meaning

In Philippine usage, “hazard pay” generally means additional compensation granted to an employee because the job exposes them to dangerous, risky, or unhealthy conditions beyond the normal or average.

It is not a universal statutory right. Instead, it can stem from:

  1. A specific law (e.g., special laws for certain sectors);
  2. A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);
  3. A written or established company policy or practice;
  4. A government issuance (for public sector employees) in a declared emergency.

B. Statutory Hazard Pay – Sector-Specific

Some sectors enjoy statutory hazard pay. For example:

  • The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (RA 7305) provides for hazard pay for public health workers exposed to high-risk conditions.
  • Other sectoral laws (e.g., Magna Carta for Public Social Workers, teachers in certain assignments, etc.) provide hazard pay for specific public servants.

Hospital security guards are generally not included in the statutory definition of “public health workers” under RA 7305. Thus, they do not automatically benefit from hazard pay under that law unless they qualify as part of the category or are explicitly included by policy.

For private sector employees, including those in private hospitals, there is no general national law mandating hazard pay across all industries.

C. Hazard Pay as a Contractual or Policy-Based Benefit

Outside specific statutes, hazard pay is usually contractual:

  • If a CBA between the security agency (or the hospital) and a union of guards provides hazard pay (e.g., per hour or per day of risky duty), it becomes a demandable right.
  • If a company policy or practice grants hazard pay regularly and consistently, it can ripen into a benefit that cannot be unilaterally withdrawn (the “non-diminution of benefits” rule under the Labor Code).
  • If the security service contract between the hospital and the security agency requires hazard pay to guards, the guard can claim it from his employer (the agency), and in case of non-payment, the hospital may be solidarily liable.

Therefore, whether a hospital security guard gets hazard pay during COVID-19 often depends on what is written (or established) in the contracts and policies, unless public sector rules during emergencies apply.


IV. Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Framework

A. RA 11058 and DOLE DO 198-18

RA 11058 (OSH Law) and its Implementing Rules (DOLE Department Order No. 198-18) mandate employers to:

  • Provide safe and healthy working conditions;
  • Supply necessary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) free of charge;
  • Conduct safety training and health promotion;
  • Prevent or remove recognized hazards and mitigate risks;
  • Provide appropriate facilities for washing, disinfection, and medical care.

During COVID-19, this general OSH obligation meant:

  • Security guards assigned at hospital entrances needed proper PPE (masks, face shields when these were standard, possibly gloves, etc.);
  • Employers had to enforce screening, distancing, and other control measures;
  • Workplaces had to adopt policies consistent with DOH and IATF guidelines.

Importantly, RA 11058 does not expressly mandate hazard pay. It focuses on hazard prevention and control, and on penalties for failure to comply (including possible work stoppage orders, administrative fines, and criminal liability in extreme cases).

B. COVID-Specific OSH Guidelines

In 2020, DOLE and DOH issued joint and individual guidelines on workplace measures against COVID-19 (e.g., interim guidelines on the prevention and control of COVID-19 in workplaces). For hospitals, compliance was stricter, given that they were high-risk environments.

Again, these guidelines emphasized:

  • Provision of PPE;
  • Regular disinfection;
  • Testing and isolation protocols;
  • Paid leave arrangements consistent with law and company policy.

They encouraged support for frontliners but did not necessarily create a mandatory hazard pay entitlement for all private sector workers.


V. Pandemic-Era Laws: Bayanihan Acts and “Frontliners”

A. Bayanihan to Heal as One Act (RA 11469)

RA 11469 (Bayanihan I) and its issuances provided:

  • Special risk allowance (SRA) for public and private health workers directly catering to or in contact with COVID-19 patients;
  • Actual hazard duty pay for certain public health workers;
  • Additional benefits for healthcare workers who died or suffered severe illness due to COVID-19.

The law and its implementing rules mostly focused on healthcare workers, not security personnel. Security guards were generally not expressly recognized as beneficiaries of SRA or hazard duty pay under Bayanihan I, unless they had dual roles or were somehow covered by hospital policies based on those laws.

B. Bayanihan to Recover as One Act (RA 11494)

Bayanihan II continued and modified these benefits, again centered on healthcare workers. It extended and refined SRA and other benefits but remained profession-specific.

There is no clear statutory text in these Bayanihan laws that mandates hazard pay to hospital security guards in general. However:

  • Some hospitals voluntarily extended hazard allowances to non-health staff, including security guards, using hospital funds or local government assistance.
  • Local government units (LGUs) or hospital boards sometimes passed resolutions to include security personnel in local hazard pay or allowances, especially in public hospitals.

Where such policies existed, they became binding and enforceable against the issuing government agency or institution, subject to budget and administrative rules.


VI. Public vs. Private Hospitals: Key Distinctions

A. Public Hospitals

In public hospitals, security guards may be:

  1. Direct hires (rare, but possible) governed by the Civil Service Law and public sector compensation rules; or
  2. More commonly, personnel of private security agencies contracted through procurement processes.

During COVID-19, the following intersecting rules were relevant:

  • DBM and CSC issuances on hazard pay and allowances for government workers who physically report to work during the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) or other quarantine levels;
  • Special guidelines extending such benefits to contract of service (COS) and job order (JO) personnel;
  • Ambiguous coverage of outsourced workers such as security guards under service contracts.

If a security guard was a government employee (e.g., directly employed by a public hospital), and the DBM or the hospital’s policy included him in hazard pay grants for on-site workers, then a clear entitlement existed.

If the guard was an employee of a private security agency, paid by the hospital under a contract, the entitlement depended on:

  • The terms of the security contract (whether hazard pay or COVID allowance was required); and
  • Any resolutions, MOAs, or policies of the hospital or LGU extending hazard pay to outsourced personnel.

Without explicit coverage, the guard’s hazard pay claim against the government hospital is legally weaker, but he may still claim against the security agency where the agency or contract promises hazard pay.

B. Private Hospitals

In private hospitals, all employees (including security agency personnel) operate under private law, guided by:

  • The Labor Code;
  • OSH Law and DOLE regulations;
  • Company policies and CBAs;
  • Civil Code principles on contracts and obligations.

No pandemic-era statute automatically mandated hazard pay for private hospital security guards as a class. Their entitlement hinged on:

  • CBA provisions;
  • Company memoranda granting COVID-19 hazard allowances;
  • Security service contract clauses;
  • Existing practice (regular payment of risk allowances, which, if continuously given, could be protected by the non-diminution rule).

Many hospitals or agencies, facing financial strain, did not grant standard hazard pay but instead:

  • Provided temporary allowances, transport or meal support;
  • Gave one-time “frontliner” incentives; or
  • Allowed special leave for high-risk personnel.

These may not legally count as “hazard pay” but are still relevant in labor disputes over benefits and alleged unfair treatment.


VII. COVID-19 as a Work-Related Illness for Security Guards

Even without hazard pay, the law offers insurance-type protection through the Employees’ Compensation (EC) Program, administered by the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC).

A. Compensability Criteria

Under PD 626, as amended, a disease is compensable if:

  1. It is listed as an occupational disease and the conditions for compensability are met; or
  2. If not listed, the employee proves that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions.

During the pandemic, ECC issued policy statements and board resolutions recognizing COVID-19 as a compensable occupational disease under certain conditions, especially for frontline medical and allied workers, and those in high-risk exposure jobs.

Security guards deployed in hospitals or quarantine facilities, who were:

  • Constantly interacting with possibly infected persons;
  • Assigned to COVID wards, emergency rooms, or triage stations;

could credibly claim that their job significantly increased the risk of infection, thus making COVID-19 work-related.

B. Benefits Under the EC Program

If COVID-19 is recognized as work-related for a guard, he or his dependents may claim:

  • Medical benefits (hospitalization, medicines);
  • Temporary total disability benefits (income replacement for lost work time);
  • Permanent disability benefits, if applicable;
  • Death benefits and funeral benefits, in case of work-related death.

These are distinct from hazard pay. EC benefits compensate after the risk materializes; hazard pay compensates for exposure to risk itself.


VIII. Collective Bargaining and Unionization

Security guards can be organized and may form or join unions, though historically unionization in the security industry is challenging due to:

  • Fragmented employment across many small agencies;
  • High turnover;
  • Employer resistance.

During COVID-19, hazard pay became a key subject of collective bargaining. Guards (or their unions) could demand:

  • A fixed hazard allowance per day of duty in high-risk hospitals;
  • A percentage premium on daily wage while the hospital is under COVID alert levels;
  • Additional leave and insurance coverage.

Refusal of management (security agency or hospital, if directly employing guards) to bargain in good faith over these demands—when a union exists and a CBA is up for negotiation—could amount to an unfair labor practice (ULP), though employers are not obliged to agree to specific economic proposals (like a particular hazard pay rate).


IX. Non-Diminution of Benefits and Company Practice

Where guards actually received hazard pay or COVID allowances for a considerable time, legal questions arose:

  • Was the benefit expressly temporary (e.g., “for the duration of ECQ only”)?
  • Or was it given without clear qualification, repeatedly, and uniformly?

Under the non-diminution of benefits rule, employers cannot unilaterally remove benefits that:

  1. Are favorable to employees;
  2. Are based on a policy or practice;
  3. Have been habitually and consistently provided over a significant period; and
  4. Are not due to error.

If hospital security guards regularly received hazard pay for, say, many months during the pandemic, they might argue that its sudden withdrawal violated this rule—unless the employer can show:

  • The benefit was clearly limited to a specific emergency period; or
  • It was granted mistakenly contrary to law or budget rules.

In public hospitals, budget and audit rules add another layer: benefits must comply with DBM and COA rules; otherwise, they can be disallowed and later charged against responsible officers.


X. Discrimination and Equal Protection Issues

A recurring practical issue was differential treatment:

  • Hospital staff (nurses, nursing aides, some administrative personnel) receiving SRA or hazard pay;
  • Outsourced workers (security guards, janitors, utility workers) receiving little or nothing, even though they also physically reported and faced risk.

From a constitutional perspective, the equal protection clause requires a rational basis for distinctions. Legally, the State and employers may prioritize health professionals due to direct patient care and statutory recognition.

However, if a hospital or LGU adopts a policy granting hazard pay to “all frontliners physically reporting during quarantine” but then excludes security guards without reasonable basis, there may be grounds for:

  • A grievance or labor complaint relying on equal treatment under the adopted policy;
  • An argument that the exclusion is arbitrary or discriminatory under general principles of labor law and social justice.

Courts have not, as of now, comprehensively ruled on such specific COVID-19 hazard pay disputes involving hospital security guards, so legal outcomes are uncertain and fact-dependent.


XI. Enforcement Mechanisms and Remedies

A hospital security guard who believes his hazard pay or related rights were violated during COVID-19 could resort to:

  1. DOLE Single-Entry Approach (SEnA) – for conciliation-mediation with the security agency and/or hospital.
  2. Labor Arbiter cases – for money claims (unpaid wages, hazard pay under contracts/policies), illegal dismissal, or ULP.
  3. Complaints to DOLE OSH inspectors – for failure to provide PPE or safe working conditions.
  4. EC claims – for work-related COVID-19 (filed with the SSS/GSIS and ECC).
  5. Grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration – if covered by a CBA.
  6. Administrative and audit processes – in public hospitals, if the issue involves government hazard pay or allowances.

Because of the triangular employment setup, the guard often needs to implead both:

  • The security agency (formal employer); and
  • The hospital (principal, as solidarily liable and possible direct employer if labor-only contracting is established).

XII. Policy Gaps and Reform Proposals

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed several systemic gaps affecting hospital security guards:

  1. Fragmented coverage of hazard pay

    • Statutory hazard pay is reserved for specific public sectors or professions.
    • Essential workers like security guards, janitors, and utility staff are often left out.
  2. Ambiguity for outsourced workers in public hospitals

    • Government hazard pay and COVID allowances sometimes included only regular, contractual, or JO personnel—but not outsourced workers, even if funded through hospital budgets.
  3. Dependence on employer generosity and bargaining power

    • In the private sector, whether guards receive hazard pay often depends on how generous the hospital or agency is, or whether guards have unions strong enough to negotiate.
  4. Lack of a clear framework for future emergencies

    • There is no general law providing baseline emergency hazard pay for all workers in declared public health emergencies, especially in high-risk industries.

Possible legal and policy reforms include:

  • A comprehensive “Frontliner Protection Law” guaranteeing:

    • Hazard pay for all workers required to report on-site in high-risk sectors during public health emergencies, including hospital security guards;
    • Clear standards for determining risk levels and corresponding hazard pay rates;
    • Mandatory inclusion of outsourced personnel in hazard pay schemes funded by public money.
  • Amendments to RA 11058 (OSH Law) or its IRR to:

    • Integrate hazard pay as a recognized protective measure in emergencies, not just PPE and engineering controls;
    • Require tripartite consultation to set minimum pandemic hazard pay standards.
  • Clear DBM/DOH/DOLE joint circulars ensuring that outsourced personnel in public hospitals are not automatically excluded from emergency hazard benefits where funds and policies allow.


XIII. Conclusion

Hospital security guards were undisputedly frontliners during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines. They managed access points, enforced health protocols, and faced routine exposure to a deadly virus—often with less pay, weaker legal recognition, and limited bargaining power compared to health professionals.

Legally, their rights to hazard pay during COVID-19 did not arise from a single, clear statutory mandate. Instead, they depended on a patchwork of:

  • General labor standards and OSH obligations;
  • Sector-specific hazard pay statutes that mostly bypassed them;
  • Pandemic-era laws (Bayanihan I and II) focused on health workers;
  • Government circulars on hazard pay in the public sector;
  • Contracts, CBAs, and company policies;
  • EC benefits for work-related illness.

This patchwork left many hospital security guards with uneven and uncertain protection, despite their indispensable contributions.

From a social justice and constitutional perspective, there is a strong argument that future legislation and policy-making should explicitly recognize all essential frontliners, including hospital security guards, and provide them with clear, enforceable rights to hazard pay and adequate protections in any future public health emergency.

Disclaimer: This content is not legal advice and may involve AI assistance. Information may be inaccurate.