I. Introduction

The Philippines has one of the world’s most active social media populations and, consequently, one of the highest rates of cyberlibel prosecutions. Republic Act No. 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, introduced “cyberlibel” as a distinct offense by applying the traditional crime of libel to acts committed through computer systems. The law imposes a penalty one degree higher than ordinary libel, making it a potent tool for both legitimate reputation protection and potential abuse.

The most controversial and practically important question that has arisen since the law’s enactment is whether merely sharing, retweeting, reacting to, or commenting on another person’s defamatory post exposes the sharer to criminal liability for cyberlibel. The Supreme Court’s 2014 en banc decision in Disini v. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014) definitively answered this question and remains the controlling doctrine more than a decade later.

II. Legal Framework

A. Traditional Libel under the Revised Penal Code

Libel is defined and punished under Articles 353 to 355 of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815):

Article 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Article 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

B. Cyberlibel under R.A. 10175

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides:

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

Section 6 of the same law states:

SEC. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special criminal laws, if committed by, through or with the use of information and communication technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Thus, cyberlibel is punished by prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods (6 years and 1 day to 10 years) or a fine, or both — one degree higher than ordinary written libel.

III. The Controlling Doctrine: Disini v. Secretary of Justice (2014)

The constitutionality of the cyberlibel provision was challenged shortly after the law’s enactment. In its landmark en banc ruling, the Supreme Court:

Upheld Section 4(c)(4) as constitutional insofar as it applies to the original author of the defamatory online post.
Declared Section 5 (aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes) unconstitutional insofar as it applies to online libel.

The Court explicitly held:

“The terms ‘aiding or abetting’ constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes ‘aiding or abetting’ libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.”

The Court further stated that if the law were interpreted to impose liability on persons who merely “receive the post and react to it” (likes, comments, shares), it would produce a chilling effect “of unimaginable proportions.”

IV. Liability of the Original Author

The original poster who creates and publishes the defamatory statement through Facebook, X (Twitter), Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, or any other platform is unquestionably liable for cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) once the elements of libel are established.

Notable convictions of original authors/posters include:

Maria Ressa and Reynaldo Santos, Jr. (Rappler) – affirmed by the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
Numerous journalists, bloggers, and ordinary netizens prosecuted for original posts

V. Liability for Sharing, Retweeting, Reacting, or Commenting

This is the core issue for most social media users.

A. Mere Sharing or Retweeting (without additional comment)

After Disini, mere sharing or retweeting of another person’s defamatory post does not constitute cyberlibel.

Reasoning:

Sharing would previously have been prosecuted as “aiding or abetting” under Section 5.
Section 5 was declared unconstitutional precisely with respect to libel.
Therefore, there is no longer any criminal law provision that punishes the act of sharing or retweeting defamatory content.

The Department of Justice, in several opinions post-Disini (particularly DOJ Opinion Nos. 15, series of 2015, and 77, series of 2016), has consistently held that mere sharing, forwarding, or retweeting without malicious comment does not give rise to criminal liability for cyberlibel.

Lower courts have dismissed numerous cyberlibel complaints filed against persons who merely shared posts, citing Disini.

B. Sharing with Additional Defamatory Caption or Comment

When the sharer adds his or her own defamatory statement (“Totoo ‘yan! Magnanakaw talaga si X!” or “Dapat ikulong ‘yan!”), the sharer becomes an original author of a new libelous imputation and may be held liable under Section 4(c)(4).

The liability attaches to the new statement, not to the act of sharing the original post.

C. Liking or Using Reaction Emojis

The Supreme Court in Disini explicitly mentioned “likes” and “reactions” as the type of conduct that cannot be punished without producing a chilling effect. Liking, loving, laughing, or using angry reactions on a defamatory post does not constitute cyberlibel.

D. Commenting

If the comment itself contains a defamatory imputation, the commenter is liable as the original author of that imputation.
If the comment merely expresses agreement without adding new imputations (e.g., “Tama ka diyan”), courts are divided, but the trend (especially in Metro Manila RTCs) is toward non-prosecution or acquittal, citing the chilling-effect doctrine in Disini.

VI. Elements That Must Still Be Proven in Cyberlibel Cases

Even against the original author, the prosecution must prove:

Imputation of a discreditable act, vice, defect, or condition
Publicity (posting where it can be viewed by third persons)
Identity of the offended party (identifiability)
Malice (presumed unless privileged communication)

Defenses that remain available:

Truth + public interest (for public officers or public figures)
Absolute privileged communication
Qualified privileged communication
Lack of identifiability
Fair commentary on matters of public interest

VII. Practical Implications for Social Media Users (2025)

The original poster remains at high risk. A single Facebook post can lead to imprisonment of up to 10 years.
Ordinary users who share or retweet controversial content without adding their own defamatory words are generally safe from criminal prosecution under prevailing doctrine and DOJ policy.
Screenshots of shared posts are frequently used as evidence against original authors, even if the sharer is not prosecuted.
Civil liability for damages (under Articles 19–36, Civil Code) is theoretically possible against sharers on the theory of abuse of rights or quasi-delict, but almost never pursued successfully because plaintiffs focus on criminal cases.
Platforms (Facebook, X, TikTok) have no criminal liability under Philippine law for third-party content (no equivalent to U.S. Section 230, but also no intermediary liability imposed).

VIII. Conclusion

Under controlling Philippine law as of December 2025, only the person who originally authors and publishes a defamatory statement on social media commits cyberlibel. Mere sharing, retweeting, liking, or reacting — without additional defamatory commentary — does not constitute a criminal offense. This rule flows directly from the Supreme Court’s 2014 Disini decision striking down the “aiding or abetting” provision as applied to online libel, a ruling designed to prevent the chilling effect that would result if every share or retweet exposed a citizen to up to ten years in prison.

While the original poster faces severe criminal sanctions, the ordinary social media user who amplifies content through sharing is, under present jurisprudence, protected from cyberlibel prosecution.