I. Introduction

Philippine legal writing and adjudication frequently employ Latin maxims as compact statements of interpretive rules. Among the most cited in statutory construction is ubi lex non distinguit (nec nos distinguere debemus)—a doctrine that disciplines judicial and administrative interpretation by insisting on fidelity to the text chosen by the lawmaking authority. In a jurisdiction where courts routinely resolve disputes involving overlapping statutes, implementing rules, and constitutional guarantees, the maxim functions as a guardrail against judicial legislation, selective enforcement, and policy-driven exceptions not found in the law itself.

This article explains the maxim’s meaning, its doctrinal foundations in the Philippine setting, how it is applied across fields of law, its interaction with other interpretive canons, and the principal limitations and cautionary notes that shape its proper use.

II. The Maxim: Text, Translation, and Core Idea

A. The familiar formulation

The maxim commonly appears in Philippine decisions and pleadings in either of these forms:

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.
Shortened: Ubi lex non distinguit.

B. Translation

“Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.”

C. Core meaning

If a legal provision is general, unqualified, or categorical, and it does not carve out classes, exceptions, or conditions, then the interpreter—whether a court, an administrative agency, or a litigant—must not invent distinctions to narrow or expand its reach.

Stated another way: the absence of statutory qualifiers is itself meaningful. When the legislature wanted to distinguish, it knew how to do so; when it did not, interpreters must resist the temptation to supply what they believe should have been there.

III. Doctrinal Foundations in the Philippine Legal Order

A. Separation of powers and legislative supremacy in lawmaking

In the Philippine constitutional structure, Congress makes laws, while courts interpret and apply them. The maxim operationalizes the separation of powers by preventing courts from adding exceptions or classifications that the political branches did not enact. It is not anti-policy; it is pro-institutional: policy preferences belong primarily to the legislature (and secondarily, within delegated bounds, to agencies), not to adjudicators.

B. Rule of law values: predictability, uniformity, and equal treatment

A central rule-of-law promise is that like cases will be treated alike under publicly known rules. Artificial distinctions—especially those emerging only during litigation—undermine predictability and risk unequal treatment. Ubi lex non distinguit supports a uniform application of legal text, particularly when the language is broad (“any,” “all,” “every,” “no person,” “whoever,” “in all cases”).

C. Relationship to Philippine statutory construction traditions

Philippine statutory construction—shaped by civil law heritage, constitutional adjudication, and common-law style case reasoning—typically begins with:

The text (plain meaning where clear),
The statute as a whole (context and harmony),
Legislative purpose and policy, where ambiguity exists.

Ubi lex non distinguit belongs to the first tier: when the statute is clear and comprehensive on its face, it counsels restraint in creating implied limitations.

IV. How the Maxim Operates as an Interpretive Rule

A. The “no extra qualifiers” principle

The maxim is triggered when a provision uses terms that are:

General (“any person,” “all establishments,” “every employer”),
Unconditional (“shall,” “must,” “in no case”), or
Complete in coverage without enumerated exceptions.

In such situations, the interpreter must not add qualifiers such as:

“only,” “primarily,” “regular,” “permanent,” “direct,” “formal,” “licensed,” “paid,” “within X class,” unless the law itself uses those qualifiers or the statutory context unmistakably supplies them.

B. The “no implied exceptions” principle

If the statute lists specific exceptions, a strong inference arises that those are the only exceptions intended. Adding more exceptions under the guise of interpretation collides with ubi lex non distinguit.

C. The “no selective inclusion/exclusion” principle

If a term naturally includes multiple categories (e.g., “property,” “income,” “person,” “instrument,” “document,” “employee”), the maxim resists interpretive moves that include one category but exclude another without textual basis.

D. A practical test used in argumentation

A common way to frame the maxim in Philippine advocacy is:

Identify the operative word/phrase in the statute.
Show it is unqualified.
Show that the opposing interpretation introduces a qualifier or class not stated.
Emphasize that the legislature could have added that qualifier (and often has done so in other statutes), but did not.

V. Typical Philippine Contexts Where the Maxim Matters

The maxim surfaces across Philippine law because many statutes are drafted using broad coverage terms and because disputes often involve attempts to narrow or widen coverage. The sections below show how the maxim is commonly applied by Philippine courts and legal actors.

A. Constitutional law

1. Rights provisions phrased broadly

When constitutional language is sweeping—e.g., “no person shall,” “the right of the people,” “no law shall”—the maxim supports application to all within the provision’s scope, unless the Constitution itself creates distinctions.

Example pattern: If a constitutional guarantee is framed as protecting “persons” rather than “citizens,” interpretation typically resists restricting it only to citizens, absent contextual necessity. (Context can still matter—some constitutional provisions expressly speak of “citizens,” and then the text itself distinguishes.)

2. Equal protection and statutory classifications

While equal protection asks whether legal distinctions are valid, ubi lex non distinguit asks a prior question: did the law make any distinction to begin with? If the statute is written without classifications, courts are less receptive to party-invented classes that justify differential treatment.

B. Administrative law and regulations

1. Implementing rules cannot add distinctions not in the statute

Philippine administrative agencies may issue implementing rules, but they cannot rewrite the law. The maxim is frequently invoked to challenge regulations, circulars, or administrative interpretations that:

Add eligibility requirements,
Add exclusions,
Narrow a benefit,
Expand a penalty, when the enabling statute did not do so.

Key idea: Delegation authorizes implementation, not invention. If the statute uses broad terms, agencies generally must implement that breadth, not curtail it by “clarifying” distinctions that are actually new policy.

2. Uniform enforcement

The maxim also supports arguments against selective enforcement—when an agency applies a general rule differently to similarly situated entities by creating informal categories not grounded in text.

C. Civil law and obligations

1. General terms in codal provisions

Civil law provisions often use general language covering “persons,” “owners,” “possessors,” “creditors,” “debtors,” or “heirs.” Where the Civil Code (or special civil statutes) does not distinguish among subclasses, courts tend to apply the rule across all who fit the described status.

2. Statutory benefits or burdens

If a statute grants a remedy to “any aggrieved party,” arguments that only certain kinds of parties may sue (e.g., only direct parties, only signatories, only those with a particular form of title) face the ubi lex non distinguit problem unless the statutory design clearly demands such a limitation.

D. Criminal law and special penal laws

1. Broad penal language and the caution of strict construction

Penal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the accused. That principle can coexist with ubi lex non distinguit in this way:

You cannot expand criminal liability by implying coverage not fairly within the text.
But you also cannot create a defense-by-distinction that excludes an accused from coverage if the text clearly and fairly includes the conduct and actor, and the statute itself provides no such exclusion.

In practice, criminal adjudication balances:

Textual coverage (including ubi lex non distinguit),
Fair notice and due process (strict construction, vagueness avoidance).

2. “Any person” in special laws

Special penal laws often apply to “any person.” Parties sometimes argue that only a specific category (e.g., only principals, only licensed actors, only those in formal positions) should be covered. The maxim resists those attempts when the statute is plainly broader.

E. Labor law and social legislation

Labor and social legislation is typically construed in favor of labor, but that pro-labor tilt is not a license to invent categories. Ubi lex non distinguit is often used to argue that a benefit, protection, or obligation written broadly should apply to all within the class described.

Common disputes include:

Whether a benefit applies only to certain employment arrangements when the law uses general terms like “employees” or “workers,”
Whether exclusions (e.g., managerial, field personnel, commissioned sales) exist only if the law or implementing issuance clearly provides them.

Where the statute or controlling issuance expressly distinguishes, the maxim yields to the text (because the law does distinguish). Where it does not, the maxim pressures uniform coverage.

F. Taxation and revenue measures

Tax law features competing principles:

Taxes are the lifeblood of government (collection favored),
Tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer.

Ubi lex non distinguit is most useful in tax cases when:

The statute’s tax base is defined broadly and a taxpayer seeks a judicially created narrowing, or
A revenue authority seeks to deny an exemption or benefit by introducing an extra requirement not in the law.

The maxim does not automatically defeat strict construction of exemptions, but it can be decisive when the exemption or benefit is stated in unqualified terms and the government’s position depends on adding conditions the statute did not impose.

G. Election law

Election statutes and rules often use categorical deadlines, qualifications, and procedural requirements. Where a rule sets a period or requirement without distinction, parties sometimes argue for exceptions based on status (incumbent vs. non-incumbent), office (national vs. local), or circumstance. The maxim supports enforcement of the rule as written, particularly when uniformity and certainty are central election values.

H. Local government and regulatory ordinances

When the Local Government Code (and local ordinances) uses broad descriptors like “business,” “contractor,” “operator,” “establishment,” disputes often involve whether a particular entity falls within those descriptors. If the text does not carve out a category, ubi lex non distinguit pushes against implied carve-outs—subject always to:

The ordinance’s overall structure,
Delegated powers,
Constitutional limits (e.g., due process, equal protection, non-impairment, preemption).

VI. What the Maxim Is Not: Common Misuses

A. It is not a substitute for full statutory reading

A frequent misuse is quoting the maxim against an isolated phrase while ignoring definitions, provisos, or related sections that actually do distinguish. Philippine interpretation insists that a statute be read as a whole. A “no distinction” claim fails if another provision creates a relevant classification.

B. It is not a command to ignore context, purpose, or harmonization

Even when a clause is broad, it must be harmonized with the statute’s structure and with other laws. Sometimes what looks like “no distinction” disappears once the interpreter identifies:

A defined term,
A cross-reference,
A limiting purpose clause,
A statutory scheme that presupposes a narrower class.

C. It is not a trump card against constitutional constraints

If the broadest literal reading of a statute would create serious constitutional problems, courts may adopt a narrowing construction to save the statute—an approach that can appear to introduce a “distinction,” but is justified by constitutional avoidance and the presumption of validity.

VII. Limits, Qualifications, and Exceptions in Philippine Application

Philippine courts generally treat ubi lex non distinguit as powerful but not absolute. Common limiting principles include:

A. When the law does distinguish—even implicitly through defined terms

If the statute defines a term in a way that excludes certain categories, then the distinction is legislative, not judicial.

Illustration: If “employee” is defined for a specific statute to exclude certain workers, invoking ubi lex non distinguit cannot override the definition.

B. When literal breadth produces absurdity or defeats the law’s evident purpose

Courts avoid interpretations that produce absurd results or defeat statutory purpose. The maxim yields when a no-distinction reading would:

Make other provisions meaningless,
Create contradictions within the statute,
Defeat the remedy the law was designed to provide.

C. When a statute is part of a larger coordinated framework

Some statutes are designed to work with related laws. A term may be broad in isolation but limited by the broader framework (e.g., licensing regimes, jurisdictional allocations, specialized procedural tracks). Courts may infer limitations necessary to maintain coherence.

D. When established interpretive doctrines counsel narrowing

In particular domains, specialized canons may temper ubi lex non distinguit:

Penal laws: strict construction and fair notice,
Tax exemptions: strictissimi juris against the taxpayer,
Statutes in derogation of rights: sometimes strictly construed,
Remedial statutes: liberally construed to effect remedy (which may actually reinforce broad coverage rather than narrow it).

E. When legislative intent is unmistakably contrary (despite broad words)

While Philippine interpretation strongly respects plain language, there are rare instances where courts consider legislative intent and the statute’s mischief to clarify that broad words were used in a limited sense. This is more plausible when:

There is ambiguity,
The language is general but context-dependent,
The contested distinction is required to avoid internal inconsistency.

VIII. Relationship to Other Canons of Construction

Understanding ubi lex non distinguit is easier when placed alongside neighboring canons frequently used in Philippine jurisprudence:

A. Plain meaning rule (verba legis)

Plain meaning says: if the language is clear, apply it.
Ubi lex non distinguit adds: if the language is clear and undifferentiated, do not introduce differentiation.

They often appear together: plain meaning justifies application; ubi lex non distinguit prevents judicial narrowing.

B. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

“The express mention of one thing excludes others.”
When a law enumerates exceptions or categories, expressio unius supports the idea that only those listed are included/excluded—often reinforcing ubi lex non distinguit by showing the legislature knew how to specify distinctions.

C. Ejusdem generis

General words following specific enumerations are limited to the same class.
This can limit a seemingly broad phrase, meaning a “no distinction” argument may fail where ejusdem generis applies.

D. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est

A “case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.”
This aligns with ubi lex non distinguit: courts should not fill perceived gaps by creating new inclusions/exclusions.

E. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat (construction to save, not destroy)

Courts prefer a reading that makes the law effective.
This principle can override a rigid “no distinction” reading if that reading undermines the statute.

IX. A Philippine Litigation and Drafting Guide: How the Maxim Is Used

A. For litigators: deploying the maxim effectively

A strong ubi lex non distinguit argument in Philippine practice usually contains:

Text-first presentation
- Quote the operative statutory language.
Show lack of qualifiers
- Emphasize “any,” “all,” “every,” “no,” “in all cases,” “whoever.”
Identify the opponent’s added qualifier
- Demonstrate precisely what new condition is being imported.
Use internal comparisons
- Point out other parts of the same law (or related statutes) where the legislature did distinguish—showing the omission was deliberate.
Address limiting principles proactively
- Explain why the broad reading is not absurd, not unconstitutional, and consistent with the law’s structure.

B. For statute and ordinance drafters: the maxim as a drafting warning

Ubi lex non distinguit is also a drafting caution: if lawmakers want distinctions, they must state them clearly. Broad language will be applied broadly. Ambiguity invites judicial construction; clarity invites textual application.

X. Illustrative Scenarios in Philippine Context

These scenarios show the maxim’s practical force without relying on any single case:

Unqualified procedural requirement
- A rule states that a pleading “shall” be filed within a certain period, without exempting government instrumentalities. A party argues the government should be exempt due to policy. Ubi lex non distinguit pressures adherence to the text unless another law provides exemption.
Benefit available to “any employee”
- A statute grants a protection to “any employee” subjected to a specified adverse act. An employer argues only regular employees qualify. If the statute does not distinguish between regular and non-regular employees (and the statutory context supports breadth), the maxim disfavors the employer’s distinction.
Regulation adds a condition
- A statute grants an incentive upon satisfaction of enumerated requirements. An agency circular adds an extra requirement “for clarity.” Ubi lex non distinguit supports striking down the added condition as beyond the statute.
Penal provision using “any person”
- A special law penalizes “any person who” performs a prohibited act. The defense argues only licensed professionals are covered. If the text is genuinely general and context does not narrow it, the maxim resists the defense’s proposed distinction—subject to strict construction and fair notice concerns.

XI. Conclusion

Ubi lex non distinguit (nec nos distinguere debemus) is a cornerstone maxim of Philippine statutory construction. It channels interpretive discipline by insisting that unqualified legal text be applied without judicially invented classifications, reinforcing separation of powers, predictability, and equal treatment under law.

Its proper use, however, requires care. The maxim is strongest when the statute’s language is clear, general, and structurally consistent with broad coverage; it is weaker when the statute as a whole contains definitions or classifications, when a no-distinction reading creates absurdity or constitutional conflict, or when other established canons legitimately narrow general language.

In Philippine legal reasoning, the maxim’s enduring value lies in its simple demand: interpretation must respect legislative choices—especially the choice not to distinguish.