Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, is one of the most frequently invoked criminal statutes in Philippine courts. Enacted on April 3, 1979 during the Marcos administration, the law was designed to protect the integrity and stability of the country’s check-based payment system by deterring the issuance of worthless checks and assuring the public that checks remain a reliable substitute for cash.

The law is short—only four operative sections—yet it has generated thousands of decided cases, administrative circulars, and doctrinal pronouncements from the Supreme Court over the past four decades.

Punishable Acts Under Section 1

BP 22 punishes two distinct modes of violation:

Issuance of a check with knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full upon presentment, and the check is subsequently dishonored for “insufficiency of funds” or “account closed.”
Failure to maintain sufficient funds for 90 days from date of the check
Any person who, having sufficient funds when he issues the check, later fails to maintain sufficient funds or credit for a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing on the check, for which reason the check is dishonored upon presentment within the 90-day period.

Both modes are mala prohibita. Good faith, absence of deceit, and full subsequent payment are immaterial to criminal liability. The gravamen of the offense is the act of issuing a check that is dishonored for lack of funds or credit.

Prima Facie Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficiency (Section 2)

The most litigated provision of BP 22 is the rule on prima facie evidence:

When the check is presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date of the check and is dishonored for insufficiency of funds or account closed, and the maker/drawer fails to pay the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days after receiving written notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is presumed.

This presumption is rebuttable, but the burden shifts to the accused to prove that he had no knowledge of the insufficiency.

Important clarifications from jurisprudence:

The 90-day presentment period is mandatory for availing of the prima facie presumption, but the offense itself may still be committed even if presentment is beyond 90 days (though the presumption no longer applies).
The notice of dishonor must be in writing and actually received (or should have been received) by the drawer. Constructive notice is insufficient.
Receipt of the notice by a person of sufficient age and discretion in the drawer’s residence or office is equivalent to receipt by the drawer himself (Domagsang v. CA, 2000).
The five-banking-day period is counted from actual receipt of the notice, not from the date of the notice.

Duty of the Drawee Bank (Section 3)

The drawee bank is required, upon dishonor, to stamp or write in plain language the reason for dishonor (“insufficiency of funds,” “no funds,” “account closed”). A mere stamped “DAIF” (Drawn Against Insufficient Funds) or “DAUD” (Drawn Against Uncleared Deposit) is sufficient.

Meaning of “Credit” (Section 4)

The term “credit” as used in the law means an arrangement or understanding with the bank for the payment of the check. A mere overdraft facility or approved line of credit qualifies.

Penalties

The penalty prescribed by BP 22 is:

Imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year,
OR
A fine of not less than the amount of the check but not more than double the amount (maximum P200,000 at the time of enactment, but this ceiling was removed by later jurisprudence),
OR both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

In practice, the Supreme Court has repeatedly directed lower courts to impose fines rather than imprisonment, especially for first-time offenders and when the amount involved is not substantial.

Key Supreme Court issuances:

Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 (November 21, 2000), as clarified by A.C. No. 13-2001 (February 14, 2001): Judges are encouraged to impose fines instead of imprisonment.
A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC (Effective May 1, 2000): Rules on BP 22 cases in the Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts.
Vaca v. CA (1998) and Eduardo v. CA (1997): Probation may be granted even if the penalty imposed is both fine and imprisonment.
Griffith v. CA (2011): The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to BP 22 cases because the penalty does not exceed one year.

Jurisdiction and Venue

Exclusive original jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, regardless of the amount of the check. The amount of the check is immaterial to jurisdiction because BP 22 is a special penal law.

Venue is the place where the check was issued, executed, or delivered, or the place where the check was dishonored (at the option of the complainant). The Supreme Court has ruled that the venue provision is jurisdictional; an information filed in an improper venue may be quashed.

Constitutionality of BP 22

The law has withstood multiple constitutional challenges:

Lozano v. Martinez (1986): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22, ruling that it does not violate equal protection (checks are a distinct class), due process (presumption is reasonable), or the prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debt (BP 22 punishes the act of issuing a bad check, not the debt itself).
Subsequent cases (Llamado v. CA, 1999; Tan v. People, 2015) have consistently reaffirmed its validity.

Distinction Between BP 22 and Estafa under Article 315(2)(d), Revised Penal Code

BP 22 and estafa are separate and distinct offenses and may be punished separately (Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 1990), giving rise to the so-called “Nierras doctrine.”

Estafa requires deceit and damage, and the postdating or insufficiency must be the inducement for the complainant to part with the money or property. In BP 22, deceit and damage are immaterial.

A single check may give rise to two separate criminal liabilities: one for estafa (if deceit is present) and one for BP 22 (mere issuance and dishonor suffice).

Common Defenses and Their Viability

Payment after filing of the case – Does not extinguish criminal liability (though it may be appreciated in mitigation of penalty).
Check was issued as guarantee or security – Jurisprudence is settled that if the check was issued to apply on account or for value (even as collateral), BP 22 applies (People v. Laggui, 1997; Lao v. CA, 1997).
Novation of the obligation – Valid defense only if the complainant expressly agreed that the obligation is extinguished and the check is merely evidentiary (Ongson v. People, 2008).
Check was postdated and complainant knew it – Still covered by BP 22; postdating does not remove the check from the coverage of the law.
Account was closed before issuance – Still punishable under the “account closed” ground.
Stop-payment order issued for valid reason – If the drawer had sufficient funds and issued stop-payment because of a legitimate dispute (e.g., defective goods), some courts have acquitted, but the Supreme Court has ruled that stop-payment does not exonerate if the drawer knew the check would bounce (Recuerdo v. People, 2019).

Compromise and Extinguishment of Criminal Liability

Criminal liability under BP 22 is not extinguished by mere settlement or payment after the case has been filed. Only when the compromise is entered into before filing, or when the court approves the withdrawal with finality, is the case dismissed.

However, full payment before arraignment is a ground for motion to quash under the 2022 Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial in Criminal Cases.

Current Judicial Policy on Penalty Imposition

As of 2025, the consistent policy of the Supreme Court remains:

Prefer fine over imprisonment.
When imprisonment is imposed, apply straight penalty (no indeterminate sentence).
Probation is liberally granted, especially for first offenders and small amounts.
Community service in lieu of imprisonment is encouraged under PD 968 as amended.

Conclusion

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 remains a potent weapon against the pernicious practice of issuing worthless checks. While originally intended as a deterrent during a period of economic difficulty in the late 1970s, it has endured for over four decades as a cornerstone of commercial law enforcement in the Philippines. Its continued vigorous enforcement—tempered by the Supreme Court’s humanitarian policy favoring fines and probation—strikes a balance between protecting the financial system and avoiding the unnecessary incarceration of individuals for essentially economic offenses.

For practitioners and the public alike, the lesson is clear: a check is not a mere piece of paper; under Philippine law, it is a solemn promise that carries criminal consequences when broken.